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WILL ROBOTS TAKE YOUR JOB? A LOOK AT VIRGINIA’S
OPPORTUNITIES AND VULNERABILITIES
It’s not about the skill level or how much education you have. Really, the primary question is, is the job on some level
routine, repetitive and predictable?
– Martin Ford, “Rise of the Robots” (Basic Books, 2015)

I

t’s not often that a study generated by two Oxford academics creates as much hubbub as did a 2013 examination that focused on which U.S. occupations are
at “high risk” of being automated within the next 20 years. Carl Benedikt Frey, an economist, and Michael A. Osborne, an engineer, led the
Oxford automation study,1 which concluded that 47 percent of total employment in 702 occupations in the United States should

be considered to be in the “high risk” category relative to the potential of automation to destroy these jobs. “Automation” here

refers broadly to the substitution by employers of machines, software-guided processes and artificial intelligence (AI) for workers.
Virtually everyone knows about mechanical dishwashers replacing human
dishwashers and one can easily visualize a single giant combine harvester
replacing dozens of farmworkers wielding scythes. Less obvious perhaps has
been the accelerating automation of the financial services industry, where giants
such as Goldman Sachs are using software programs instead of highly paid
associates to conduct and write research, make stock trades, summarize relevant
news and even communicate with customers. Consider also the use of sensors
rather than people to pick out which microcircuits or even heads of lettuce that
are of inferior quality and therefore should be discarded. Or, consider that a
computer now can defeat the best human chess player and an AI program
developed by Google “learned” on its own how to beat the reigning world
champion at Go, the exceedingly complex 2,500-year-old strategy game.1
An increasing number of McDonald’s restaurants now have computer screens
that take your order – rendering unnecessary some of the workers formerly
behind the counter. No minimum-wage law applies to the computer screens.
In the realm of higher education, the advent of new distance-learning tools
and the rise of “MOOCs” (massive open online courses) are disrupting the

1 C
 arl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, “The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to
Automation?” Oxford Martin School, Sept. 17, 2013. www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/
The_Future_of_Employment.pdf.
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centuries-old “sage on the stage” model that emphasizes professors lecturing to
groups of more or less interested students arrayed in front of them.
Highest on the risk list are occupations that include telemarketers, tax
preparers, library technicians, etchers and engravers, and bank tellers. Frey
and Osborne argue that up to 87 percent of jobs in the accommodation and
food services sector are at risk, as are up to 54 percent of jobs in finance and
insurance. Lowest on their risk list are occupations such as elementary school
teachers, doctors and dentists, nurses, many health care workers, plumbers,
theatrical makeup artists and foresters.
Data presented in this chapter relate either to the U.S. or
Virginia. What about Hampton Roads? Bureau of Labor
Statistics occupational data that focus on mid-sized regions,
such as ours, are much more variable than statewide data
and, in some cases, simply not available. Presentation of these
data might lead to unjustified conclusions. Hence, we do not
offer any regional data, though some are available.

The Common Denominator
What determines whether the jobs of workers in some occupations (say,
secretaries and legal researchers) are at high risk, while the jobs of workers
in other occupations (nurses and plumbers) are not? The key is not
necessarily the level of education required for each job,
though this may play a role. Instead, the overriding deciding
factor is the extent to which jobs require creative and social
intelligence, perception, interpretation and the ability to
manipulate as opposed to being dominated by repetitive,
routine tasks capable of being learned by machines fueled by
artificial intelligence.
Note that job recovery in the United States (and Virginia) from the Great
Recession of 2008 has been built upon relatively low-skill service jobs that pay
relatively low wages. It is often these jobs that Frey and Osborne argue are
most at risk because of automation. The reason is that they involve repetitive
tasks that can be programmed into a machine or computer. Further, the
machine frequently can complete those tasks with a higher level of quality and
do so at a lower per-unit cost than their human counterpart. Think about the
computer screen that is taking the place of behind-the-counter personnel at
Panera Bread.

Reality is that computerization of jobs no longer is confined to traditional
assembly-line, mass-production industries. However, it also is true that some
manual labor tasks require physical adaptability and flexibility in approach.
Hence, workers doing these tasks are more resistant to automation than
those in other jobs that often require more education, but nevertheless can be
imitated by “smart” machines.
It is the exercise of reasoning, judgment, creative abilities and the application
of social interaction skills that most frequently cause a job to fall into the low
automation risk category rather than high risk. One does not need a bachelor’s
degree to become an electrician or a plumber (both low-risk occupations).
Nevertheless, electricians, automobile mechanics and plumbers must be able
to assess, interpret, adjust, reason and create when inserted into unpredictable
situations. “You never know what kinds of wiring and connections you’re going
to find in an old house,” a veteran electrician told us. Some variant of this
observation, however, might be applied to nurses, engineers and multimedia
artists. On-the-job experience often assumes great value in such positions
because it provides workers with a set of proficiencies that enables them to
exercise sound judgment in situations that seldom are repetitive.
On the other hand, the tasks confronting a telephone operator, shipping clerk
or Las Vegas gaming employee tend to be repetitive and frequently can be
replaced by a smart machine. True, these jobs usually require less formal
education than those in low-risk occupations. However, it is not education

Some analysts believe that Frey and Osborne’s estimates are substantially too high. A 2016 Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) study takes issue with their methodology and argues that it isn’t all workers in an occupation that are
at risk, but rather specific jobs within occupations. Thus, some workers at financial firms can readily be supplanted by trading
algorithms incorporated into software, while others cannot be replaced because of their personal relationships with specific firms
and customers. The OECD study concludes that only 9 percent of all jobs are at risk because of automation (Melanie Arntz, Terry
Gregory and Ulrich Zierahn, “The Risk of Automation for Jobs in OECD Countries,” www.oecd-ilibrary.org, May 2016). A July
2016 study produced by McKinsey analysts Michael Chui, James Manyika and Mehdi Miremadi (“Where Machines Could Replace
Humans — and Where They Can’t (Yet),” www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/business-technology/our-insights/where-machinescould-replace-humans-and-where-they-cant-yet?cid=other-eml-alt-mkq-mck-oth-1607), concluded that 60 percent of all occupations
in the United States could see 30 percent or more of their work activities being automated.
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per se that makes the difference here, but rather the presence or absence of
repetitive tasks, reasoning and creativity.
The principle is straightforward: Repetitive, predictable tasks
are susceptible to machine learning and the application
of artificial intelligence. Thus, college professors, despite
their Ph.Ds., may indeed find some of their number being
replaced by learner-driven technology that is capable of doing
what they do, but at a reduced cost. Ironically, the learner-driven
technologies with access to abundant data and feedback may actually be
more sensitive than the typical college professor is to the peculiar geographic
locations, job and family situations, and learning preferences of individual
students.
Contrast college professors to elementary school teachers, very few of whom
hold a doctorate. These teachers cannot be replaced by a machine because of
their need to exercise judgment, interpret what is going on in their sometimes
unpredictable classrooms, develop individually focused plans of action on
the fly, and use their social skills to deal with impressionable and sometimes
delicate young people. Elementary school teachers are among the least at-risk
workers in society today.

What The Studies Say
(And Do Not Say)
Neither Frey and Osborne, nor the OECD or McKinsey Global Institute, are
rigid determinists. They speak in terms of probabilities (“susceptibilities”) rather
than certainties. The future they paint is a plausible one, yet not one that is
inevitable. Why? Because technological change and changing prices may
alter the world they have addressed. Consider the following situations.
• Think of a new machine that is capable of performing many of the tasks of
a software engineer; however, this machine is prohibitively expensive and
hence what is feasible is not economic.
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• Further, even when a machine is capable of performing a task inexpensively,
there may be a visible gap between the machine doing that task
inexpensively and doing it well. Consider automated checkout lines at
supermarkets and automated check-in lines at airports. Intelligent machine
innovations such as these reduce supplier costs, but clearly can be the source
of customer frustration and delays.
• The use of “big data” has the potential to diminish the need for human
judgment and interpretation that currently cause some jobs to be resistant
to automation. A range of cognitive tasks could be susceptible to machine
learning and recognition if their development is based upon large data sets
that are capable of recognizing patterns and therefore can capture the key
aspects of human choice and behavior. Just as big data enable Amazon to
suggest books that customers might like based on their internet behavior,
these data sets also might inform activities ranging from selling automobiles,
houses and tickets to serving legal clients and responding to calls for law
enforcement.
• None of the studies directly addresses the distinction that some economists
currently make between “tradable” versus “nontradable” goods. Tradable
goods are those that are sold internationally in competitive markets, for
example, cellphones. In tradable markets, automobile workers in one
country (say, the U.S.) can lose their jobs to automobile workers in another
country (say, China) because of international competition. By contrast,
goods and services in nontradable markets are not subject to international
competition. A hairstylist in Hampton isn’t in competition with a hairstylist
in Beijing. Even so, things can change. Consider that tax preparation used
to be a predominantly local industry – relatively few customers went outside
of their hometowns to get their tax returns completed. However, because of
automation, a tax preparer in Suffolk now can lose her job to tax preparers
in New York City or Beijing who are using software and internet connections
that enable them to prepare tax returns for residents in Southwest Virginia.
The point is easily understood: Automation converts some goods and services
from tradable to nontradable and this can result in the loss or shuffling
of jobs. This trend is likely to continue as software driven by artificial
intelligence makes it possible for items such as tax forms to be completed
anywhere.

• Frey and Osborne point out that many of the people who will lose their jobs
as a result of automation are among those in society least able to cope with
such disruptions due to background, education and lack of mobility. It seems
likely, therefore, that the impact of automation will be felt unevenly across
income classes.
• The analysts do not directly discuss current proposals, such as a $15 per
hour minimum wage, but economic analysis predicts that such a law would
provide an additional incentive for employers to accelerate the adoption of
laborsaving automation. The salient questions are whether the nature of their
production processes, their specific collective bargaining agreements and
the law actually give them the flexibility to do so. The answers clearly differ
across industries and even inside industries.
None of the analysts should be regarded as champions of the world they
foresee. They are impartial reporters of the facts as they view them. Still, they
note that the demise of high-risk jobs will increase unemployment at least in
the short run and likely increase economic inequality as well unless society
provides financial incentives and invests in job retraining programs designed
to ease the flow of people from the high-risk occupations where jobs are
being lost, to low-risk occupations where the number of jobs is increasing.
Of course, this may be easier said than done. How does one teach creative
and social skills, how to interpret and make judgments, and how to adjust
to the unexpected to people who may have lower than average intellectual
abilities and who for decades have been performing repetitive tasks? How
does one convince an unemployed steelworker with a family and a mortgage
that he or she should move from West Virginia to Texas? Frey and Osborne
are straightforward: “For workers to win the race, however, they will have
to acquire creative and social skills.” This is important advice, given that
McKinsey suggested in 2013 that sophisticated algorithms could substitute for
approximately 140 million full-time knowledge workers worldwide.2

The National Picture
For the United States as a whole, Frey and Osborne estimate that 47 percent of
all nonfarm jobs fall into their “high risk” category in terms of being eliminated
because of automation. In April 2016, this would have translated to 67.64
million nonfarm jobs – a staggering number.3 However, even if Frey and
Osborne’s estimates are precisely on the mark, it does not follow that these
losses will occur immediately. Multiple decades sometimes are required for
industries to adjust to new realities. Witness the slow deterioration of output
levels and jobs in the coal, textile and tobacco industries in Virginia.
Graph 1 reports the five broad occupational categories that Frey and Osborne
estimated have the greatest vulnerability to job losses because of technological
change, plus the five broad occupations with the least susceptibility.
The McKinsey study approaches the job vulnerability question through a
somewhat different lens by focusing on 2,000 different work activities in
more than 800 occupations. Similar to the OECD, McKinsey argues that
individual occupations are distinctive in requiring a variety of different
work activities, which might include physical movement, processing data,
interacting with customers and the like. These work activities have varying
potential for automation. The McKinsey study provides estimates of the
portion of time during each workweek that a typical worker spends on each
specific work activity. Graph 2 reports the estimates of the percentage of time
during a typical workweek that workers in the United States spend on various
work activities. From left to right, these range from the work activities least
susceptible to automation (such as managing others) to those most susceptible
to automation (predictable physical work).
Miles Brundage of Slate asks an interesting question: In the
future, will “made by humans” become a phrase equivalent to
“organic” or “fair trade?” www.slate.com (Sept. 27, 2013)

2 M
 cKinsey Global Institute, “Disruptive Technologies: Advances That Will Transform Life, Business and the
Global Economy.”

3 This is a seasonally adjusted number and includes government employees.
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Graph 1
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PERCENT OF TIME SPENT IN VARIOUS WORK ACTIVITIES IN ALL U.S. OCCUPATIONS, 2014
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Where physical work is concerned, it is the predictability of the motions
involved with that work that is the key to the susceptibility of a particular
occupation to automation. McKinsey concluded that 78 percent of jobs
involving predictable physical work (welding, food preparation and
packaging of products) are prone to be automated, whereas only 25 percent
of jobs involving less predictable physical work (construction, forestry and
raising outdoor animals) are vulnerable. Using the same analysis, McKinsey
concluded that 47 percent of a retail salesperson’s activities have the technical
potential to be automated, but fully 86 percent of the jobs of the retail sector’s
bookkeepers, accountants and auditing clerks are in jeopardy. McKinsey
reported these estimates in detail in a 2015 study.4 The consulting group
concluded that 45 percent of all work activities could be automated using
already available technologies, but only 5 percent of all occupations (the Frey
and Osborne focus indicator).
The McKinsey analysts also estimated that more than 20 percent of a typical
CEO’s working time could be automated using currently available technologies.
The analysts concluded that several lower-paid occupations, such as health
aides, landscapers and maintenance workers, faced fewer risks associated
with automation because the work of the individuals in these occupations could
not easily be replaced by a machine or replicated by means of AI.
The consulting group found that the amount of workers’ average hourly wages
explained only 19 percent of the variability in their automation susceptibility.
That is, it was the characteristics of specific work tasks rather than the
monetary value of that work that was the most important determinant of
whether or not those work tasks were vulnerable to automation. High salaries
did not guarantee reduced susceptibility to automation. Indeed, the opposite
may be true – high salaries increase the incentive for employers to seek ways
to automate.

4 M
 ichael Chui, James Manyika and Mehdi Miremadi, “Four Fundamentals of Workplace Automation,”
www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/business-technology/our-insights/four-fundamentals-of-workplaceautomation (November 2015).
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are going to be lost in Virginia. Additionally, as noted above, even if these job
losses do occur, decades may be required for this to happen.

Frey and Osborne examined 702 specific occupations as defined by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and ultimately assigned a probability to each
occupation that is their estimate of the susceptibility of the jobs in that
occupation to disappearing because of automation. Let’s begin our analysis
by applying their technique to 22 broad occupational labor force segments
in Virginia. Table 1 supplies these data, which apply to 3,682,470 Virginia
nonfarm workers in 2015 in the Commonwealth.

In general, we can see in Table 1 that there is a tendency for
the negative job impacts of technological change to land most
heavily on the least-educated members of the labor force – but
only if their jobs involve the repetitive, absence of judgment
characteristics mentioned previously. The key to surviving
automation is not worker education, per se, but instead job
characteristics involving varied tasks that require workers to
make judgment calls, on occasion to use their intuition and in
some cases to work together as a team.

It is evident in Table 1 that Frey and Osborne’s methodology suggests that
1,877,540 jobs in Virginia are susceptible to automation whereby a machine,
software or artificial intelligence replaces the worker. This is 51 percent of
all Virginia jobs (compared to the national average of 47 percent) and these
jobs account for $70.56 billion in annual wages. Note that Virginia’s total
employment roster is slightly more vulnerable to technological change than is
true for the United States. This implies that Virginia’s workforce has a lower
percentage of workers performing nonrepetitive tasks that require judgment
and on-the-job flexibility.
That one’s job is susceptible to being lost to technological change does not
mean that this actually will occur. Not all employers choose to automate, or
to do it in the same ways. Further, some work tasks that appear to be highly
repetitive sometimes turn out not to be so at crucial decision points in the work
process and therefore resist “pattern recognition” – the application of artificial
intelligence in a manner that adequately imitates what a human being would
do in a specific situation. A manufacturing robot, for example, might be superb
at detecting minute differences in the size and weight of items being produced,
but nevertheless be unable to detect emerging differences in smell or color.
Human participation and intervention still are required in some situations.
Frey and Osborne are not inerrant savants who can see around corners
and neither are we. They note that “making predictions about technological
progress is notoriously difficult” and acknowledge that some occupations will
experience future tumult from automation that they currently do not predict.
For example, one should not read the numbers in Table 1 to mean that it is a
certainty that more than 278,000 jobs relating to food preparation absolutely

Note that if the previously referenced OECD study is correct, then the number
of Virginia jobs at risk is not 1,877,540, but rather only 327,822 – still a large
number, but one that would be much more manageable. The OECD critique
of Frey and Osborne’s work focuses on the variability in the occupational
circumstances and conditions the OECD believes exist inside the 702
occupations that Frey and Osborne analyze. This variability, the OECD argues,
means that it often is inappropriate to include all jobs in an occupation in a
category labeled “at risk.”
No doubt some variability in job activities and requirements does exist inside
conventionally labeled occupations; however, 702 distinct occupations is a
large number and separate analysis of each occupation at this level of detail
likely picks up considerable heterogeneity in worker tasks. Nonetheless, the
OECD analysis underlines that the most expansive estimates of the impact
of automation on jobs should be inspected carefully and probably deflated.
Further, even if 47 percent of all jobs in the United States are at risk because
of automation, it does not follow that the loss of these jobs would occur
immediately. Decades might be required for such an adjustment to occur.
The slow, downward employment evolution of the automobile, coal and
steel industries in the United States illustrates the often-gradual nature of
occupational and industrial change.
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TABLE 1
FREY AND OSBORNE’S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO AUTOMATION TECHNIQUE APPLIED TO 22 BROAD JOB CLASSIFICATIONS: VIRGINIA, 2015
Broad Occupational Group

Virginia Total
Employment

Average Hourly
Wage

Average Annual
Income

Total Virginia Annual
Wages

Percent Jobs at
Risk

Total Jobs at Risk

Total Annual Wages
at Risk

Management Occupations

166,610

$ 61.79

$ 128,530

$ 21,414,383,300

13.10%

21,826

$ 2,606,680,168

Business and Financial Operations
Occupations

251,780

$ 39.24

$

81,620

$ 20,550,283,600

43.37%

109,197

$ 8,561,241,991

Computer and Mathematical
Occupations

195,140

$ 46.52

$

96,750

$ 18,879,795,000

13.31%

25,973

$ 2,020,223,511

Architecture and Engineering
Occupations

73,790

$ 41.31

$

85,930

$

6,340,774,700

21.15%

15,607

$

985,125,516

Life, Physical and Social Science
Occupations

31,160

$ 39.76

$

82,700

$

2,576,932,000

19.38%

6,039

$

414,754,154

Community and Social Service
Occupations

50,870

$ 22.91

$

47,660

$

2,424,464,200

4.16%

2,116

$

86,907,634

Legal Occupations

36,050

$ 49.75

$ 103,480

$

3,730,454,000

27.53%

9,925

$

565,249,295

237,250

$ 25.93

$

53,930

$ 12,794,892,500

11.74%

27,853

$ 1,051,500,158

48,510

$ 27.51

$

57,220

$

2,775,742,200

17.85%

8,659

$

198,840

$ 36.24

$

75,390

$ 14,990,547,600

14.30%

28,434

$ 1,366,670,286

Healthcare Support Occupations

85,840

$ 14.00

$

29,120

$

2,499,660,800

23.70%

20,344

$

Protective Service Occupations

99,650

$ 21.41

$

44,530

$

4,437,414,500

44.31%

44,155

$ 1,604,686,868

Food Preparation and Serving Related
Occupations

318,730

$ 11.00

$

22,870

$

7,289,355,100

87.47%

278,793

$ 6,239,845,855

Building and Grounds Cleaning and
Maintenance Occupations

124,970

$ 12.21

$

25,400

$

3,174,238,000

74.02%

92,503

$ 2,369,839,041

Personal Care and Service Occupations

119,900

$ 12.47

$

25,930

$

3,109,007,000

41.06%

49,231

$ 1,057,000,959

Sales and Related Occupations

392,330

$ 18.61

$

38,710

$ 15,187,094,300

76.13%

298,681

$ 9,298,746,336

Education, Training and Library
Occupations
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports and
Media Occupations
Healthcare Practitioners and Technical
Occupations
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531,050,098

625,569,235

TABLE 1
FREY AND OSBORNE’S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO AUTOMATION TECHNIQUE APPLIED TO 22 BROAD JOB CLASSIFICATIONS: VIRGINIA, 2015
Broad Occupational Group
Office and Administrative Support
Occupations

Virginia Total
Employment

Average Hourly
Wage

Average Annual
Income

Total Virginia Annual
Wages

Percent Jobs at
Risk

Total Jobs at Risk

Total Annual Wages
at Risk
$ 14,749,877,695

549,560

$ 17.58

$

36,570

$ 20,097,409,200

76.83%

422,227

6,380

$ 15.77

$

32,800

$

209,264,000

41.54%

2,650

$

Construction and Extraction Occupations

156,160

$ 20.36

$

42,360

$

6,614,937,600

61.58%

96,163

$ 3,743,489,693

Installation, Maintenance and Repair
Occupations

144,650

$ 22.65

$

47,110

$

6,814,461,500

56.94%

82,364

$ 3,649,015,736

Production Occupations

171,550

$ 17.51

$

36,420

$

6,247,851,000

73.82%

126,638

$ 4,328,941,847

Transportation and Material Moving
Occupations

222,750

$ 17.41

$

36,220

$

8,068,005,000

63.05%

108,162

$ 4,606,862,311

$ 190,226,967,100

50.99%

1,877,540

$ 70,563,968,152

Farming, Fishing and Forestry
Occupations

Totals

3,682,470

100,689,765

Source: May 2015 Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) data are available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/oes/tables.htm. The May 2015 area level estimates are the first OES estimates to use the 2010
metropolitan statistical area definitions.
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Is Technological Change
(And Job Churning)
Speeding Up?
Is the job-churning process identified by Frey and Osborne going to
accelerate? That is the trillion-dollar question. It’s true that nearly everywhere
we look, there is evidence of technological change: self-driving automobiles
and intelligent tractors, smartphones with amazing capabilities, potent new
drugs, cloud computing, disease-resistant crops, medical therapies tailored
to a specific individual’s genetic makeup. The list of technological changes
is impressively long and some argue that this lends credence to futurist Ray
Kurzweil’s 2001 prediction: “We won’t experience 100 years of progress in
the 21st century – it will be more like 20,000 years of progress (at today’s
rate).”5 The implication is that technological change is going to cut a wide
swath through global labor forces in the coming decades.
Perhaps, but there are others who point out that for all of the marvelous
technological innovations that have occurred in recent years, actual
productivity increases have been disappointingly small. As George Mason
University economist Tyler Cowen put it, “Silicon Valley has not saved us
from a productivity slowdown” (The New York Times, March 4, 2016). The
fundamental economics is simple: If technological innovations do not lead to
significant increases in productivity, then this seriously diminishes their lure.
Why invest in equipment, software enhancements or AI unless such investments
are really going to make a difference?
Graph 3 reports the average annual growth in labor productivity (literally,
output per worker hour) in the United States over the past 20 years. One
can see that since 2009, labor productivity growth has stalled and now is
clearly on a lower trend line than it was in the previous decade. This reduces
5 h
 ttp://www.kurzweilai.net/the-law-of-accelerating-returns. Kurzweil and others speak of “singularity,”
a situation in which technological change has become so rapid and so profound that it disrupts, perhaps
even destroys, human life as we know it. In this view, technological change is a double-edged sword that
simultaneously generates benefits, such as longer life spans and reduced physical drudgery, even while it
introduces significant new dangers that range from the obvious (nuclear bombs) to less-obvious AI innovations
and nanobots that are controlled by unscrupulous forces, perhaps even other, nonhuman AI software.
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the incentive for decision makers to invest in new technologies that hold little
promise of improving the firm’s bottom line.
Economic data leave little doubt that there has been a slowdown in productivity
growth that actually dates back to about 1970. Some label this “secular
stagnation,” but whatever its label, it has afflicted nearly all mature Western
economies that have not been sitting on substantial oil deposits. Some
highly reputable analysts, such as Northwestern University’s Robert Gordon,
argue that recent decades have been characterized by a dearth of truly
consequential, cost-reducing, production-increasing innovations (“The Rise and
Fall of American Growth,” Princeton University Press, 2015).
Nevertheless, even if productivity were not declining, reality is that a significant
proportion of recent innovations have been labor-saving in nature – apparent
advances that cause firms and organizations to substitute machines and AI
for people. Consider that in 2015, the United States produced 21.3 percent
more manufactured output, but accomplished this with 16 percent fewer
workers than in 2001.6 Further, this and similar episodes of automation often
generate ripples of change throughout the economy. As self-driving cars and
trucks move into the mainstream, the jobs of mechanics, insurance agents, car
salespersons and repair shop workers will be disrupted, and some of them no
doubt will lose their jobs.
In the long run, society as a whole emerges better off and
enjoys a higher standard of living when such developments
occur because these innovations free up workers who
subsequently can be employed doing other things. Remember
that in 1800, approximately 90 percent of the labor force in
the United States was involved in agriculture. Today, less than
2 percent of our labor force is so occupied, but that 2 percent
is marvelously productive. The remaining 98 percent of the
labor force is employed doing other things that have resulted
in dramatic growth in our standard of living.7

6 O
 ld Dominion University calculations based upon U.S. Department of Commerce data and the North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
7 In the jargon of economics, such innovations push out society’s production possibilities curve and make it
possible for society to improve its standard of living.

The short-run story, however, can be painfully different. Workers
displaced by technological innovations lose their jobs and subsequently may
find it difficult to obtain new employment. In some cases, this is because they
are not qualified for the jobs that are available – they are the proverbial
square pegs attempting to fit into round holes. Jobs exist for welders, but
steelworkers who have lost their jobs are not trained to weld.
It is these “susceptible” individuals/workers whose circumstances are
highlighted by Frey and Osborne. Not only may some of them lose their jobs,
but also their spell of unemployment could turn out to be disappointingly long
because they are not qualified to fill available job openings. They also could
be both emotionally and geographically immobile. Or, the economy could be
in the midst of recession and employers simply don’t need additional workers.
Whatever the reason, they are the “at risk” employees in today’s economy.
While we sometimes hear alarmist rhetoric about job-destroying new
technologies, the available data do not really support this interpretation. Graph
4 reports the absolute number of job layoffs and discharges by month in the
United States between 2000 and 2016. Immediately visible is the upward spike
in layoffs and discharges produced by the Great Recession. Other than this,
since 2011, monthly levels of layoffs and discharges in the United States now
are lower than they were at the turn of the century. It’s not clear that changes
in technology, whether accelerating or not, have resulted in huge numbers of
displaced workers who have lost their jobs to machines, software or AI.
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Graph 3
GRAPH 3

Annual Percent Growth in Labor Productivity (Output per Hour) in the United States, 1996-2015
ANNUAL PERCENT GROWTH IN LABOR PRODUCTIVITY (OUTPUT PER HOUR) IN THE UNITED STATES, 1996-2015
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GRAPH 4

Graph 4
NUMBER OF JOB LAYOFFS AND DISCHARGES BY MONTH: UNITED STATES, 2000-2016
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Implications
When technological change occurs, it often results in some workers losing
their jobs and increased levels of economic inequality. Predictably, labor
unions and worker advocates (some political) often resist such adjustments and
demand that generous benefits be paid to those affected and that extensive
job retraining programs and educational alternatives be offered at very low
personal cost to each displaced worker. Similar arguments are made when
freely flowing international trade causes workers to lose their jobs. One can
make a credible equity case for supplying such benefits and programs to
displaced workers even though the available economic evidence discourages
the notion that there are conspicuous skill shortages (even in STEM-related
occupations)8 in American labor markets and the rates of return realized by
governments that finance job retraining programs often are mediocre.
A dynamic, growing economy requires willingness on the part of firms and
organizations (including governments) to accept and implement cost-effective
new methods of production and service. In response, wise public
policies in this arena should focus on “riding the wave” of
technological change rather than encouraging resistance
movements that are destined to prove futile. Astutely
constructed public-private partnerships between governments
and firms have the potential to develop programs designed
to compensate and redirect job losers, who in many cases are
relatively innocent victims of dynamic economic forces well
beyond their control.

occupations. Examples of skills currently in demand include computer coding,
welding and a wide variety of tasks associated with health care. The recent
emphasis on “credentialing” may provide a means for individuals to upgrade
their qualifications and abilities without committing themselves to entire
academic degree programs.
With respect to flexibility, wherever possible, education and training should
emphasize suppleness in thinking and approach, rather than rote memory. As
Fareed Zakaria of The Washington Post (March 26, 2015) put it so succinctly,
“Critical thinking is, in the end, the only way to protect American jobs.”
Occupational shortages come and go, often in unpredictable sequences.
Workers now stay with the same employer for a median of only 4.6 years.9
The days of virtually guaranteed, steady employment with the same firm are all
but gone. Like it or not, flexibility on the part of both employers and employees
is the key to success.
With respect to mobility, wise public policy will reduce barriers that discourage
people from moving geographically and/or telecommuting to jobs that may be
located thousands of miles away.
Relatively little in this domain will occur either easily or without controversy;
witness recent discussions surrounding disrupters Uber and Lyft. What the
available empirical evidence does tell us, however, is that the current range of
public policies is insufficient to deal with the occupational ferment that Frey and
Osborne have identified. We are forewarned.

Three classes of programs commend themselves. These involve
increasing the skills, flexibility and mobility of the workforce.
With respect to skills, policy focus should be upon proficiencies that count
in modern labor markets. This is not the same thing as generating massive
numbers of additional bachelor’s degree holders, or STEM-degree holders,
though many elected officials make this a high priority. To the surprise of
many casual observers, there is relatively little rigorous economic evidence
available that a significant shortage of job candidates exists in STEM-related
8 S
 ee Peter H. Cappelli, “Skills Gaps, Skill Shortages, and Skill Mismatches: Evidence and Arguments for the
United States,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 68 (March 2015), 251-90.
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9 Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/tenure.pdf.
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